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11. Introduction1
The continuing or mounting presence of right-wing populist parties in Western
Europe’s political landscape today is a phenomenon escaping explanations centred on
the level of individual countries. Despite some differences in the policies advocated
by these parties, there seems to have been a certain convergence in their
programmatic profile. This centres on what has been termed “differentialist nativism”
and is increasingly combined with a position in favour of economic protectionism, at
least in the international domain (Betz 2002, 2004).
Right-wing populist parties should be seen, I suggest in this paper, in the larger
context of changing societal structures that have affected party systems since the late
1960s. More specifically, extreme right-wing populist parties represent a reactionary
counter-offensive to the universalistic values advocated by the libertarian left, which
have found their party political manifestation in the emergence of Green party and in
the transformation of Social Democratic parties, as Kitschelt’s (1994) analysis has
shown. The mobilization of the libertarian left having caused a first restructuring of
political space in the 1970s and 1980s, the populist right has succeeded in setting the
political agenda in the 1990s, resulting in a second transformation of the dimensions
of political conflict (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming). Whereas Kitschelt hat differentiated
several types of radical right wing parties, I follow Betz (2004) in arguing that the
“identitarian turn” in the discourse of the populist right has resulted in a programmatic
convergence of these parties.
An analysis of the dimensions of political space in six countries shows that an
economic and a cultural line of conflict structure oppositions within these party
systems. While the opposition between state and market characterizes the economic
axis, the cultural axis opposes a universalistic position advocating autonomy and the
free choice of lifestyles on the one hand and an emphasis on tradition and an
opposition to immigration on the other. From a theoretical point of view, and building
on the debate between liberal and communitarian positions in political philosophy,
                                                 
1 This paper presents first results from a dissertation project carried out within the project “National
Political Change in a Globalizing World”, conducted jointly by a team at the University of Zurich
(Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, Romain Lachat, Timotheos Frey and the author of this paper) and by a
team at the University of Munich (Prof. Edgar Grande, Dr. Martin Dolezal). The project is financed
by the Swiss National Science Foundation and by the German Research Community (DFG).
2these issues can be conceived as lying at opposing poles of an axis of political conflict
that runs from a libertarian-universalistic to a traditionalist-communitarian position.
However, if both the universalistic as well as the reactionary potentials were
already present at the attitudinal level in Western mass publics in the 1970s, as Sacchi
(1998) has shown, then political factors are required to explain the belated
manifestation of the traditionalist-communitarian potential. While the cross-national
diffusion of the “differentalist nativist” political frame is certainly an important factor
(Rydgren 2005), it is insufficient to answer the question why right-wing populist
parties have been successful in some countries and not in others.
Here, I propose to view the lines of opposition structuring party competition and
their relative salience within a party system as a factor mediating the manifestation of
latent political potentials. While two axes of competition can already be detected in
the 1970s (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming), I suggest that the rise of the populist right is a
product of the rising salience of cultural as opposed to economic issues in the 1990s,
resulting in a weakening of the alignments structures by the traditional state-market
cleavage.
The shift in emphasis from economic to cultural issues can be accounted for by the
impact of the twin processes of globalization and European integration. Both result in
a diminished autonomy of economic and social policy making at the national level,
thereby contributing to a weakening of the saliency of economic as opposed to
cultural conflicts. Globalization and Europeanization have thus catalyzed the (belated)
manifestation of the reactionary pole of the universalistic-traditionalist axis of
political conflict. My thesis then is that right-wing populist parties have been
successful where the established right does not take clear positions regarding cultural
liberalism, tradition and immigration, thereby opening a window of opportunity for
new and marginal political actors to gain room.
Two propositions are tested in this paper by means of an analysis of parties’ issue
positions deriving from a coding of the media coverage of election campaigns in six
countries (France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Britain). This
data has been collected within the research project in which I participate and is based
on a sentence-by-sentence coding of the newspaper coverage and parties’
advertisements in election campaigns. The first proposition is that right-wing populist
parties are located in a distinct position in political space. Together with two further
3criteria, namely, their anti-establishment discourse and their hierarchical internal
structure, they can thus be considered a common party family. This hierarchical
internal structure results in a strategic flexibility, allowing these parties to rapidly take
up new issues that can be interpreted in terms of the universalism-traditionalism
conflict, such as opposition to European integration. The second proposition is that
political space is structured by the same two dimensions in those countries where
right-wing populist parties have not found great resonance at the national level,
namely, Britain and Germany. Consequently, the populist right’s lack of success in
these two countries is partly due to the fact that established right-wing parties have
adopted similar issues centring around national tradition and an opposition to the
universalistic values advocated by the New Left.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I discuss the advent of
the libertarian-authoritarian value divide and its impact on Western European party
systems. My argument is that as a consequence of the mobilization of the populist
right, the cultural axis of conflict is now best understood as an opposition between
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. The third section
deals with the mechanisms underlying the rise of extreme right-wing populist parties,
namely, the role of globalization and Europeanization as a catalyst for attempts at
exclusionary collective identity formation. After this, I discuss right-wing populist
parties’ competition with established parties of the right and lay out the criteria for
inclusion in the extreme right-wing populist party group. The “candidates” in the six
countries examined are the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party, the
Swiss People’s Party and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn. The fifth section proceeds to
the empirical analysis. Here, I examine the dimensionality in the six countries and put
the propositions to a test, addressing the question if these parties indeed belong to a
single party family, and (tentatively) assessing the chances of similar parties emerging
in Germany and Britain.
42. Value-based conflicts and the transformation of traditional cleavages
The advent of value-based conflicts in the late 1960s
The enduring success of right-wing populist parties in a number of European
countries suggests the existence of some common potential underlying their rise. My
claim is that the underlying causes of this rise can best be understood in terms of the
general transformations witnessed by European party systems since the late 1960s,
when new political issues arose that had more to do with values and life-styles than
with traditional, materialist questions of conflict. As Inglehart (1977) has put it, a
“silent revolution” took place that led segments of society to question traditional
societal values and forms of politics. As a result a “postmodern political conflict” has
developed, which was initially described as an opposition between materialist and
post-materialist values by Inglehart.
Differing somewhat from this initial emphasis on political styles (e.g. Offe 1985),
the resulting conflicts are now more often described as cultural and value-based in
character. As Flanagan and Lee (2003) have recently shown, an opposition between
“libertarian” and “authoritarian” values continues to polarize the inhabitants of
advanced industrial countries. The two authors conceive the shift from authoritarian to
libertarian values as representing a long-term process of secularization, which leads
from theism over modernism to postmodernism. In theism, the localization of
authority is external and transcendental, and truth and morality are based on absolute
principles. In modernism, it is still external, and universal, but based in and
constructed by society. Finally, in postmodernism, the location of authority “has
become internal and individual” (Flanagan, Lee 2003: 237). The authors conceive the
resulting cultural conflict as a result of the mobilization and counter-mobilization
around the new social issues that have replaced economic issues on the political
agenda.
Consequently, after distributive issues had structured the left-right divide for a long
time, the movements’ of the left brought value and identity issues on the political
agenda. Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984), together with Inglehart (1984), claimed
early on that identity- and lifestyle-politics were transforming the traditional left-right
divide, leading to the political realignment of social groups that blurred the socio-
5structural basis of voting choice. In a similar vein, Kitschelt (1994) has then shown
that in the 1980s, the value divide had created a two-dimensional political space in
European party systems. Cross-cutting the “old” distributional axis, a line of conflict
opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to structure the attitudes of
voters. At the heart of this conflict, in Kitschelt’s account, are different conceptions of
community, where the values of equality and liberty in a self-organized community
form the one pole, while on the opposite pole, conceptions of community are
structured by values of paternalism and corporatism (Kitschelt 1994: 9-12).
This conception is quite similar to the somewhat broader pattern that Flanagan and
Lee (2003) have detected. As a variety of sources of the policy positions of political
parties show, political space in advanced western democracies is at least two, if not
three-dimensional (Warwick 2002). However, it is not clear to which degree these
dimensions are really new or if they have simply been rendered more salient in the
past decades. Most probably, this is due to the fact that the new value opposition so
far has only been discussed in relation to the traditional class cleavage. But even if
most European party systems do not carry the stamp of all four cleavages detected in
Rokkan’s (2000) model of the divisions resulting from the national and industrial
revolutions, many European countries are characterized by more than just one
cleavage. With the religious cleavage representing the second common structuring
element of European party systems (Kriesi 1994: 211-234), political space in
multiparty systems is likely to have been two-dimensional already before the New
Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s transformed the meaning of „left“ and
„right“, as described by Kitschelt. Indeed, Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) explicitly relate
today’s libertarian-authoritarian value divide to an opposition between religious and
secular worldviews.
On the political left, the prominence of libertarian political issues has given rise to
the establishment of Green parties and a transformation of Social Democratic parties
early on in the 1980s, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. As a result of this change, they
have attracted an increasing number of votes from the middle class, especially in
certain constituencies of it such as among the so-called social-cultural professionals
(Kriesi 1993, 1998, Müller 1999). On the political right, however, the impact of this
new axis of conflict has had less of a uniform impact, although Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) have argued that radical right parties constituted the opposite pole on the new
libertarian-authoritarian axis of conflict. Similarly, in Ignazi’s (1992, 1996, 2003)
6interpretation, radical right parties are a “by-product of a Silent Counter-revolution”,
in other words an equivalent on the right to Inglehart’s “Silent Revolution”. However,
the process these authors sketch out for the rise of the radical right is much more
country-specific than the process on the left, although there too, there were
differences in the timing of the emergence of Green parties.2 Similarly, the political
orientations of right-wing extremist supporters seem to have varied between countries
as well (Gabriel 1996).
Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995: Ch. 1) explicit differentiation of European Radical
Right-wing parties exemplifies the heterogeneity of this category. In the case of their
“winning formula” of the New Radical Right, authoritarian and pro-market appeals
are combined in a programmatic profile which seems somewhat contradictory, but
allows parties such as the Front National to appeal to losers of modernization, as well
as to disenchanted segments of the middle class. In other cases, the model is specified
in that party systems and political economies characterized by patronage make a
populist-anti-statist strategy most successful, as in the case of the Austrian FPÖ or the
Italian Lega Nord. In still other cases, a “welfare chauvinist” strategy is most
promising. Due to these differences in the programmatic profile of the radical right, it
is debatable if its rise can be considered an equivalent transformation of the political
right to that of the left in its move towards libertarian positions.
I would argue that in the 1980s, the “winning formula” of right-wing populist
parties consisted not so much in a specific programmatic profile, as Kitschelt argued,
but in a strategic flexibility, which allowed them to capture issues that other parties
had neglected. Right-wing populist parties’ main commonalities in their first
mobilization phase in the 1980s were, therefore, primarily their anti-establishment
discourse (Betz 1998 and the country chapters in Betz and Immerfall 1998, Schedler
1996). This was combinable with advocating issues which the established parties did
not take up, in the 1980s for example neo-liberal demands (in the domestic realm),
and allowed right-wing populist parties to present themselves as “anti-cartel-parties”
in Katz and Mair’s (1995) terminology. Immigration policies, on the other hand, did
not play a prominent role until the early 1990s (Betz 2004: Ch. 2).
Hence, to the degree that oppositions on the cultural axis of political competition
are likely to develop into a reconfiguration of existing cleavages, this process has
                                                 
2 For an explanation linking this to the positions of the established parties, see Hug (2001).
7probably only started in the 1990s. While empirical studies have shown that an
authoritarian potential arose at approximately the same time as the libertarian
potential (Sacchi 1998), this has not immediately resulted in strong support for
traditionalist stances. For this traditionalist or authoritarian potential to be politicized
in a way that mobilizes broad segments of society, it probably has to be connected
with more concrete political conflicts that are conductive to collective identity
formation. Both social movement theory, as well as Cleavage-theory teaches us that a
durable organization of collective interests requires the prior construction of a
collective identity (Melucci 1996, Klandermans 1997, Tarrow 1992, Pizzorno 1986,
1991, Rokkan 2000, Bartolini, Mair 1990, Bartolini 2000).3
Underlying my argument is the assumption that right-wing populist parties’
communitarian-exclusionist discourse is successful because it is conductive to the
formation of an exclusionist collective identity.4 For one thing, right-wing populist
parties can be seen as part of a broader movement of the right, which has its origin in
broad societal transformations that oppose social groups for structural and cultural
reasons, similarly to the New Left (Kriesi 1999). Accordingly, and as is not so often
noted, the movements of the right – such as religious, fundamentalist and nationalist
movements – are equally manifestations of identity politics, and are just as much
concerned with recognition, as Calhoun (1994: 22f.) points out.5 Nineteenth century
European nationalism, for example, represents a rather “old” form of identity politics
according to Calhoun.
The fact that movements of the right are also manifestations of identity politics is
perhaps not so evident since the underlying pattern is more diffuse. Whereas the
libertarians’ quest for recognition is often associated with specific goals, such as those
which the New Social Movements have been fighting for, the traditionalist-
authoritarian pattern is essentially conservative and reactive, rather than liberating. As
a conservative movement, its values and goals are probably relatively diffuse, and
                                                 
3 For reasons of space, I omit a more in-depth discussion on the role of collective identity in the
formation of political cleavages as well as their transformation in political realignments. Although
the element of collective identity is usually acknowledged in the cleavage literature, it is then often
unduly neglected in theoretical considerations concerning the possible emergence of new cleavages
and even more in empirical analyses of cleavages. For a more detailed discussion, see Bornschier
(2005).
4 As Loch and Heitmeyer (2001: 19) have argued, this is a characteristic of all authoritarian
developments in the past decades. However, I would argue that the communitarian-exclusionist
discourse represents a particularly sucessfull attempt at molding a collective identity.
5 For a detailed account of the concept of recognition, see Honneth (2003) who derives the concept
both from philosophy and from social psychology.
8therefore more dependent on political elites than the libertarian goals. For this reason,
I assume the formation of a collective identity to be more a matter of deliberate
molding of political elites than the grass-roots mobilization of the movements of the
libertarian left.
I would argue that in the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of
European countries have found a programmatic stance that is conductive to collective
identity formation. As a consequence, they can be considered as a common party
family that represents the counter-pole to the libertarian left. While I assume the
underlying potentials to be country-specific, depending mostly on the programmatic
position of the established parties, this does not rule out Rydgren’s (2005) quite
plausible suggestion that the success of the populist right owes a lot to cross-national
diffusion of political frames.
Following from the discussion so far, I hypothesize that the programmatic profile
right-wing populist parties have converged on has two constituting elements. The first
centres on new issues or discourses, such as their anti-immigration stance, which does
not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2002, 2004) has called “differentialist
nativism” or “cultural racism”. The second group of issues brought up by the populist
right, including the rejection of the multicultural model of society as well as
universalistic values in general, primarily represent a reaction against the societal
changes brought about by the libertarian left.
However, my contention is that both groups of issues are theoretically as well as
empirically situated at one pole of a new axis of conflict that may be labelled
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian. Before I go into explaining
the mechanisms that have allowed right-wing populist parties to mobilize this
traditionalist-communitarian potential, the next section will substantiate the claim that
the issues advocated by the libertarian left and the populist right are indeed polar
normative ideas. This will be crucial for the interpretation of the empirical results
concerning parties’ positioning in political space.
The libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian axis of conflict
From a theoretical perspective, Rokeach (1973) has suggested early on that the space
of possible ideological positions is two-dimensional. While Rokeach finds a number
9of values to structure people’s belief systems, there are severe limits to the number of
combinations that are effectively viable when it comes to politically relevant values.
For one thing, Rokeach (1973: 23) claims that there is a limited number of common
human problems for which peoples must find a solution. And the range of possibilities
is limited, for one thing, because not all combinations of values are possible, and for
the other, because most combinations devoid of “human activity”, as Wildavsky
(1987: 6) puts it. That is, they are not viable because they have no cultural or
historical material to draw upon, no relevant paradigms or blueprints. In Moscovici’s
(1988) terms, one could say that they lack corresponding social representations.
As a consequence, Rokeach proposes a model where politically relevant ideologies
are ultimately combinations of two values: freedom and equality. The model is
validated by a quantitative content analysis of Socialist, Communist, Fascist and
Capitalist texts, which each represent a different combination of the emphasis of
freedom and equality, respectively. Similar dimensions are found in the accounts of
Wildavsky and his colleagues (Wildavsky 1987, 1994, Thompson et al. 1990), and
while there is disagreement concerning the labelling of the two dimensions, they
essentially correspond to those propagated by Kitschelt (1994): Conflicts over the
value of equality structure the state-market axis, while differing emphases on freedom
structure the communitarian or libertarian-authoritarian axis of conflict. In other
words, these issues are not new as such; only their rising salience is intrinsic to post-
industrial societies, a point I shall return to later on.
A synthesis of normative models of democracy provided by Fuchs (2002: 40-43)
suggests that our conception of viable value-combinations indeed draws on existing
blueprints or normative substantiations. In Fuchs’ mapping, a first dimension that is
observable within political thought represents the responsibility of citizens’ life,
opposing self-responsibility and a stronger responsibility of the state, corresponding to
the established state-market line of conflict. The second dimension concerns the
nature of the relationship between individuals. It is exemplified by libertarian or
liberal conceptions of democracy on the one hand and republican conceptions on the
other.
This latter dimension is at the centre of the ongoing philosophical debate between
liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and communitarian conceptions
of the person (see Honneth 1993). Implicit in this discussion is an opposition between
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universalistic and traditionalistic values. Although communitarian thinkers such as
Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) only propose a (modest) communitarian corrective
to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-
reaching critique of the universalistic principles established by Rawls (1971). As an
example of the liberal account, Dahl (1989) denies any substantive values as
constituting the common good. In his conception, the common good consists in the
conditions of equal participation – in the universalistic democratic process itself, in
other words.
Even moderate communitarians such as Michael Walzer (1983, 1990) and Charles
Taylor (1992) have argued that universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions
within an established community and therefore engender the danger of being
oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic
principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established cultural practices.
And since the liberal-universalistic theory no less than other accounts ultimately
depend on the plausibility of this conception of the individual, this view cannot be
considered as more objective than a communitarian approach, as Taylor (1992)
argues. Communitarians, on the other hand, urge us to acknowledging the fact that our
identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception of
the self is misconceived.6
Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from
communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the
concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the superiority of any nationality or
race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions.
In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for the discourse of right-wing
populist parties (Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 2000). As Antonio (2000: 57-8)
summarizes:
“[…] New Right opposition to African, Middle Eastern, or Asian immigration
stresses the evils of capitalist globalization, resistance to cultural
homogenization, and defense of cultural identity and difference. Their pleas
for »ethnopluralism« transmute plans to repatriate immigrants into a left-
sounding anti-imperialist strategy championing the autonomy of all cultural
groups and their right to exert sovereignty in their living space. […] They
                                                 
6 Habermas’ (1998) discourse model represents an attempt to bridge these two conceptions, arguing
that discourse can establish universalistic principles that do justice to the respective cultural
traditions of those participating in the deliberation.
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contended that modern democracy’s melding of diverse ethnic groups into a
mass »society« destroys their distinctive cultural identities. In their view, it
dissolves cultural community into atomized, selfish, impersonal economic
relations.”
Thus, the liberal-communitarian debate may well have rendered such ideas more
plausible, although I would not go as far as suggesting a substantial affinity between
the two currents, as Birnbaum (1996) has claimed.7 However, what seems plausible is
that communitarian arguments have provided a “blueprint” (in the above-mentioned
sense) or a broader justification for the right-wing populist parties’ differentialist
discourse, which is much harder to attack intellectually than biological racism.
From a theoretical point of view, then, the defense of cultural tradition and a
rejection of the multicultural model of society represent a counter-pole to
individualistic and universalistic conceptions of community. Immigration is directly
linked to this conflict since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds
endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right as well as
exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to preserve. Equally present
in communitarian thinking is an emphasis of the primacy of politics over abstract
normative principles. In Walzer’s (1983: Ch. 2) account, the right to self-
determination within a political community includes the right to limit immigration in
order to preserve established ways of life.8
To which degree right-wing populist parties have actually converged on a profile
corresponding to the discourse of the New Right will be addressed in the empirical
part of this paper. However, even if the reasoning so far is correct, one thing that is
left to explain is the timing of the hypothesized convergence in programmatic profile.
If the populist right represents a reaction to the values of the New Left, why was this
reaction not immediate? Here, I suggest that we have to address is relationship
between economic and cultural issues and, more specifically, the decline in
importance of economic issue and the rising salience of cultural issues. My hypothesis
                                                 
7 Antonio (2000: 63) argues that the expressed sympathies of Alain de Benoist, a leading thinker of
the French New Right, towards North American communitarians is rather one-sided.
8 It has to be emphasized that Walzer merely conceives universalistic principles (everyone is allowed
to move where he/she wants to) and the preservation of established traditions as conflicting goals.
Hence, he does not deny the legitimacy of refugees – political or economic – migrating to more
secure or more prosperous countries in principle.
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is that the underlying cause of this shifting emphasis lies in the domain of economic
policy-making under conditions of globalization and Europeanization.
3. Potentials and mechanisms underlying the rise of the populist right
Potentials for exclusionary identity formation
As argued in the preceding section, the “identitarian turn” of right-wing populist
parties, as Betz (2004) has called it, can be considered their “winning formula” from
the late 1980s or early 1990s on. However, if this programmatic profile was
“invented” by the French Front National in the early 1980s and then adopted by other
parties in a process of cross-national diffusion of frames, as Rydgren (2005) has
argued, why did it take parties such as the Swiss People’s Party or the Austrian
Freedom Party several years to reach their high levels of electoral success?
The country-specific timing of the rise of the populist right needs to be embedded
in an in-depth analysis of the patterns of party competition, taking into account both
the positions of voters as well as the programmatic stances of parties (Bornschier
2005). While such an analysis is not the aim of this paper, I will try to highlight the
central mechanisms underlying right-wing populist parties’ rise. First of all, I have
argued that right-wing populist parties’ communitarian-exclusionist discourse is a
(deliberate) attempt at collective identity formation. At the heart of the mechanism of
exclusionary identity formation as I have formulated it lies the social aspect of
identity, in other words the “categories, attributes, or components of the self-concept
that are shared with others and therefore define individuals as being similar to others”
(Monroe et al. 2000: 421).
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1982: Ch. 5) suggests that there is something like a
natural propensity of humans to group-formation and to the demarcation from others.
This is because social groups provide members with social identities, whose
maintenance is important for individual’s positive self-esteem.9 Arguably, this is also
one of the aspects central to the concept of recognition, as in Honneth’s (2003)
                                                 
9 Similarly, Burke (2004: 10) argues that social identities have a bearing on feelings of self-worth.
This mechanism is central in various, otherwise competing social psychological theories linking
identity to group formation and intergroup conflict. See the overview in Monroe et al. (2000).
13
account. As Tajfel (1982: Ch. 6) has shown in the experiments underlying his
“minimal group paradigm”, and as subsequent research has validated, even a random
assignment of individuals to different groups leads them to exaggerate between-group
differences and to downplay within-group differences. Furthermore, groups not only
favor their in-group in the distribution of resources, over and above this they try to
maximize the differences in allocation even if there is no personal gain at stake.
Consequently, an individual interest, material gain or concrete conflict over resources,
which “realistic group conflict theory” posits (e.g. Quillian 1995), is not necessary to
provoke group-formation and the development of prejudice towards out-groups, as
Monroe et al. (2000: 435) summarize: “Unlike realistic group conflict theory, social
identity theory argues that the self-esteem that individuals receive from evaluating the
in-group (and thus themselves) positively in relation to the out-group is enough to
drive self-identification and intergroup discrimination.”
At the same time, the room available for the formation of new collective identities
is conditioned by existing group loyalties. Identities related to traditional cleavages
based on class and religion have typically crosscut such broader ascriptive or identity
categories. As Kriesi and Duyvendak (1995: 5-10) have argued, there exists a zero-
sum relationship between old and potentially new cleavages. The greater the degree of
social closure of the groups separated by the established cleavage structure, and the
less pacified the conflicts associated with this cleavage, the smaller the mobilization
potential of new conflicts. Arguably, both of these elements impinge on the group
awareness of the group question, and thus on the intensity of the group identity
underlying a cleavage.
This mechanism can be specified in drawing on Stryker’s (1980, 2000) identity
theory, which posits that new identifications stand in direct competition with
established group attachments. Consequently, much therefore depends on the latter’s
salience. Applying Stryker’s (1980: 60-1, 2000) concept of the salience hierarchy of
identities, changing voting patterns of social group are possible only as a consequence
of a gradual transformation in individuals’ salience hierarchy. For example, it can be
hypothesized that the advent of a post-industrial economy, or the long-term trend of
secularization has led to a withering of working-class and religious identities,
allowing other identities – old or newly salient ones – to gain room.
Therefore, if these cleavages lose their structuring power, this can enable identity
and ethnic categories to manifest themselves or to resurface in politics. This
14
proposition is supported by students of ethnic conflicts, who stress the fact that
“Ethnicity competes with other large-scale bases of organization, notably class
mobilization, for the loyalty, time, and resources of potential members” (Olzac 1992:
18). In the context of waning traditional cleavages, political campaigns then play an
important role in the mobilization of such identities, as Monroe et al. (2000 : 441)
point out, since from a social psychological point of view, “Campaigns not only draw
on existing groups and group bias but also construct new coalitions from latent
identity categories.”
Connecting this reasoning with the opposition between communitarian-
traditionalist and libertarian-universalistic values discussed earlier on, the rise of
identity politics is not a product of post-industrialization alone. The degree to which
differing emphases on freedom come to structure party oppositions very much
depends on the centrality of conflicts regarding equality. It is then only the
diminishing importance of distributional conflicts that allows “post-industrial
conflicts” to gain room.
Contrary to Inglehart’s modernization theory, then, I would argue that political
agency plays a much more important role in the shaping and reproduction of
collective identities. Building on the notion that conflict has group-binding functions
(Coser 1956), the continuing salience of the traditional cleavages very much depends
on the degree of conflict between parties regarding the issues tied to traditional
cleavages.10 Accordingly, a perceived de-emphasis of traditional conflicts in the eyes
of voters opens the way to a rising salience of other dimensions of conflict. As
Schattschneider (1975: Ch. 4) has put it, every form of political organization has a
bias to the mobilization of some conflicts while not being receptive to others. If the
established cleavage structure no longer “organizes” issues cutting across established
lines of division “out of politics”, in Schattschneider’s famous words, then new issues
can ascend. As I will argue in the next section, the diminished “marge de manoeuvre”
in economic policy making due to globalization and European integration provides
one of the backgrounds for the manifestation of the communitarian-traditionalist
political potential.
                                                 
10 A more detailed argument is presented in Bornschier (2005).
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Globalization as a catalyst for the mobilization of the exclusionary communitarian
potential
I suggest two ways in which the acceleration of Globalization and the process of
European integration have catalyzed right-wing populist parties’ mobilization of the
traditionalist-communitarian potential that has emerged alongside the libertarian
thrust advocated by the New Left. Globalization for the present purposes can be
understood broadly as a spatial widening and an intensification of regional or global
economic and cultural interactions (Goldblatt et al. 1997: 271, Held et al. 1999). As
an economic phenomenon, globalization is a contributing factor to modernization. In
this sense, it is likely to engender new social divisions (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming,
Esping-Andersen 1999). The “loosers” of modernization are lower-skilled individuals
who either have increasing difficulty in competing on the labor market, or who face a
relative decline in real income, depending on a country’s politico-economic system
(Scharpf 2000: 68-124). Indeed, the share of households at the lowest end of the post-
redistribution income scale has risen in Great Britain, Austria, the Netherlands and
slightly in Switzerland since the 1970s or 1980s, while Germany and France do not
display such a clear trend (Alderson and Beckfield 2004, Alderson and Nielsen 2002).
Even more important, however, is the fact that national economic and social
policy is becoming less effective as a consequence of the imperatives of economic
globalization on the one hand, and of re-regulation by international or supra-national
organizations on the other hand, most notably the European Union (Keohane, Nye
2001, Keohane, Milner 1996). As a consequence, a real problem of legitimacy arises,
since “Governments must increasingly avoid policy choices that would be both
domestically popular and economically feasible out of respect for GATT rules and
European law or as a result of decisions made by the WTO, the European
Commission, or the European Court of Justice” (Scharpf 2000: 116; similarly Mény
and Surel 2000, Offe 1996). At the same time, the loss of effectiveness of national
economic and social policy makes the intensity of the conflict between labor and
capital decline (Zürn 2001: 120).
This has important implications: First of all, since many governments have
justified unpopular measures in economic and social policy with the structural
imperatives of globalization and EU-integration, a potential arises for political actors
that insist on the primacy of politics as against these imperatives. Right-wing populist
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parties, in this sense, can be understood as “anti-cartel parties”, which can mobilize
resentment due to the perception that the established parties are not responsive to the
preferences of voters (Katz, Mair 1995, Blyth, Katz 2005). Kitschelt (2000) has
vividly criticized this view, arguing that parties always have an interest in exiting the
cartel in order to attract votes. However, as Blyth and Katz (2005) argue, the
cartelisation of party systems represents a rational response by political parties to the
inability of constantly expanding the provision of public goods to secure support
without endangering economic growth. The solution parties have therefore opted for
is a collective discourse of “downsizing” expectations, together with two further
“survival strategies”, as the authors point out: “externalizing policy commitments” to
independent central banks, the EU or other supra-national organizations, as well as
distancing themselves even further than the catch-all party type from any defined
social constituency that could hold them accountable (Blyth, Katz 2005: 42).11
Consequently, then, de-nationalization leads to a weakening of the collective
identities underlying the traditional state-market opposition, according to the logic
depicted earlier on and developed at more length in an accompanying paper
(Bornschier 2005). This is because the declining leeway for autonomous national
economic policy leads to a convergence of parties’ positions on the class cleavage and
to a loss of credibility of the solutions parties propose to solve problems such as
unemployment. For the “losers” of modernization, along with other disenchanted
segments of society, voting for right-wing populist parties may therefore become a
viable option, despite parties such as the Austrian FPÖ and the French Front National
having advocated free-market policies in the 1980s, that are hardly in the interest of
these social groups.
From a historical perspective, Bartolini (2004) has underlined the crucial
importance of the establishment of national boundaries for political structuring along
functional lines of opposition such as class or primary vs. secondary sector. As
opposed to the cultural cleavages resulting from the national revolution – most
prominently the conflict between the church and the state – such functional
oppositions depended on the absence of exit-options within the nation state. Read
                                                 
11 Furthermore, Kitschelt’s argument is inconsistent since a few pages on, he traces dissatisfaction
with parties to the very non-responsiveness that Katz and Mair (1995) can be assumed to have in
mind: „Dissatisfaction with parties does not originate in their new capacity to form cartels and
dissociate themselves from their voters, but [...] in the political-economic agenda of policy-making,
confronting parties with inevitable trade-offs among objectives voters would like to maximize
jointly [...]“ (Kitschelt 2000: 160).
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inversely, the lowering of boundaries as a consequence of European integration and
global economic transactions result in a political de-structuring along functional lines
at the national level (Bartolini 2004: Ch. 5-6).
Expectations regarding the positions of right-wing populist parties
Developing expectations, I suspect a potential for right-wing populist parties
constituted primarily by citizens located at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of
the universalism-traditionalism axis of conflict. Differing from Kitschelt’s (1995)
claim that the most successful right-wing populist parties mobilize by means of a
combination of authoritarian and free-market issues, my argument implies that these
parties almost exclusively mobilize on the cultural axis. A recent analysis of the
determinants influencing the support for the Swiss People’s Party in a number of
Swiss cantons supports this view (Kriesi et al. 2005).
There is also a lot of evidence to suggest that right-wing populist parties such as
the French Front National or the Austrian FPÖ are increasingly elected by citizens
who can be considered as the losers of mobilization due to their lack of education and
their few or obsolete skills (Plasser, Ulram 2000, Betz 2001, Perrineau 1997, Mayer
2002), even if these groups are not generally over-represented among the voters of the
Swiss SVP (Kriesi et al. 2005). Studies of the ideological profile of the Front
National’s electorate suggest that its lower-class component has strongly “leftist” or
state-interventionist preferences concerning economic policy, contradicting
Kitschelt’s proposition (Perrineau 1997, Mayer 2002). While there are also more well
to-do segments within its electorate, which have more neo-liberal preferences, as
Perrineau and Mayer show, the average position of the Front National’s electorate is
rather centrist on the economic axis (Bornschier 2005). Finally, Ivarsflaten (2005) has
presented evidence that those voting for the populist right in France as well as in
Denmark are fundamentally divided on the economic axis.
Hence, to the degree that right-wing populist parties still take a market-liberal
stance as they did in the 1980s, I assume lower-class electors to vote for them despite
the parties’ economic profile, rather than because of it. And what is even more
plausible is that the “proletarianisation” of right-wing populist parties’ electorate in
the 1990s has also engendered a shift in their programmatic offer away from neo-
liberal demands, as Betz (2001, 2004) has suggested. This is in line with the thesis
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that globalization and Europeanization strengthen attitudes in favor of “economic
protectionism”, which in Europe is associated with an opposition to European
integration (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming).
However, while Betz (2002, 2004) has provided evidence that right-wing populist
parties increasingly take an anti-globalist stance, a pro- vs. anti-globalization conflict
is so far not apparent in election campaigns (Kriesi et al. Forthcoming). However, this
conflict is embodied in disputes over European integration. The delegation of
competences to the EU-level can be accused of undermining an autonomous
economic and social policy at the national level, thereby mobilizing economic
grievances in political or cultural, rather than genuinely economic terms. Opposition
to the EU therefore fits the ideological package of the populist right, because it can be
interpreted in terms of the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian
line of conflict, Europe endangering national traditions and sovereignty. Hooghe,
Marks and Wilson (2002) have provided evidence that the libertarian-authoritarian
axis is an important determinant of parties’ positions towards the EU, with the
populist right appearing as the prime opponent of the process of European integration.
At the same time, left-right-positions are unable to explain stances toward the EU,
indicating that the process of supra-national integration is primarily interpreted in
cultural, rather than in economic terms.
The empirical part of this paper will provide an opportunity to test these
propositions empirically, starting from the hypothesis that right-wing populist parties
have de-emphasized neo-liberal demands and now most commonly advocate what has
been termed a “welfare chauvinist” position. At the same time, where European
integration is an issue in national elections, I expect right-wing populist parties to take
a position in opposition to the EU.
However, even if the factors discussed above have gained more strength in the
past few years and served as a catalyst for the mobilization of the traditionalist-
communitarian potential, they do not explain the timing of the rise of the populist
right. Indeed, if the underlying potential of right-wing populist parties’ rise was
already present in the 1970s, as Sacchi (1998) has shown, their manifestation was
delayed due to (i) the persisting strength of existing alignments on the one hand and
(ii) the inexistence of a political offer suitable to mobilize them on the other hand.
While an analysis of the first element of this explanation is beyond the scope of this
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paper, the second one is at the centre of the following section, where I address the
defining characteristics of right-wing populist parties.
4. Right-wing populist parties within their party systems
The competition with established centre-right parties
If a sizable proportion of the electorate hold preferences that are located at the
traditionalist-communitarian pole of the axis structuring belief systems in advanced
industrial countries, it is of course not evident why it should be (exclusively) right-
wing populist parties that mobilize this potential. Indeed, I assume that where the
established parties take a clear position on the cultural axis and do not leave the
related issues to marginal political actors, right-wing populist parties are presumably
less successful in mobilizing the potential described above.
At the same time, it is plausible that right-wing populist parties themselves
contribute through their discourse to molding the attitudes that are supportive to their
success. As I have argued, as a reactionary potential, the traditionalist-communitarian
bundle of values may be rather diffuse and less tied to concrete issues than the fight
for recognition of difference on the part of the libertarian New Social Movements.
Hence, movements of the right’s struggle for recognition has so far often manifested
itself not in genuinely new issues but in the “resurfacing” of older identity categories
such as national identity and culture – even if they appear in new disguise as in the
case of the “differentialist nativist” discourse. Even if the reaction to the societal
transformations since the 1960s could in principle take various forms, my contention
is that a traditionalist-communitarian discourse and an opposition to immigration are
the most promising issues because they are highly conductive to collective identity
formation, a precondition to a durable organization of interests, as laid out before.
Apart from the strength of exiting alignments that leave varying room for the
politicization of new conflicts, a central factor mediating right-wing populist parties’
success then is whether of not the established parties of the right take a clear position
on the cultural axis of conflict. Resulting from the transformation of Social
Democracy, Socialist parties have positioned themselves near the libertarian-
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universalistic pole of the cultural axis of conflict (Kitschelt 1994), leading to a
realignment of voters on the political left (Kriesi 1993, 1998, Müller 1999). Most
moderate right-wing parties, on the other hand, have found it difficult to take a clear
position on the new axis, because the electoral coalition supporting them is united
concerning economic issues, but divided over cultural issues. It can therefore by
argued that while the emergence of the Ecologist parties and the transformation of
Social democracy led to a first transformation of political space, right-wing populist
parties are now driving a similar transformation on the political right (Kriesi et al.
Forthcoming).
The central factors influencing the success of the populist right are therefore
twofold: First, their success is conditioned by the strength of existing alignments
relating to the class cleavage (Bornschier 2005). Where these alignments remain
strong or where the economic axis remains dominant, the potentials for realignments
in favor of the populist right are limited. Secondly, right-wing populist parties are
only successful in mobilizing the traditionalist-communitarian potential if the
corresponding position in political space is not already occupied by an established
party that adopts a similar discourse. The second proposition will be tested in the
following section. While in four of the six countries studied parties are present that are
likely candidates for the right-wing populist party family – namely, the FPÖ, the Front
National and the LPF – no such parties exist in Germany and in Great Britain.
The main innovation of right-wing populist parties, as opposed to older overtly
racist parties, was the adoption of a discourse based on “differentialist nativism” (Betz
2002, 2004), and an advocacy of the introduction of direct democratic institutions.
These are important innovations for the following reasons: On the one hand, social
psychological studies have shown that “blatent” prejudice is relatively rare among
European citizens, while more subtle forms of prejudice are much more common
(Pettigrew, Meertens 1995). On the other hand, democracy represents an almost
universal value (Fuchs et al. 1995). Hence, by avoiding overtly racist statements and
in advocating more instead of less democracy, the new populist right can mobilize
beyond the narrower radical right constituency.
If established right-wing parties and new populist right at times advocate similar
issues, then quite evidently the question arises how these two groups of parties can be
analytically distinguished. This is a last issue I address before proceeding to the
empirical analysis.
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An extreme right-wing populist party family?
The term (extreme) right-wing populist is used in this paper to denote political parties
that, despite having distinct historical origins, share certain commonalities that
distinguish them from other parties. However, even if it may seem easy to identify the
presumable members of such a party family, naming clear analytical criteria is a much
more difficult task. Consequently, the consensus regarding definitions of the Extreme
Right is slim, posing a problem for comparative research (Mudde 1996). In my view,
the label right-wing populist has the advantage over similar terms such as “radical
right-wing” or “extreme right” of being more inclusive towards parties that declare
supporting democracy or even calls for the introduction of direct democratic
institutions. While this pro-democratic discourse makes it difficult to call them anti-
system parties, they are certainly polarizing parties, drawing on Capoccia’s (2002)
framework. (Only for the sake of brevity do I drop at times the term “extreme” from
the label). I use three criteria to distinguish the right-wing populist party family, one
relating to their extreme position in political space and two relating to the populist
element that also constitutes a defining feature of this party family. The criteria are the
following:
(1) A location at the extreme on the ideological axis ranging from libertarian-
universalistic to traditionalist-communitarian positions. The criterion of
extremeness is similar to one used by Ignazi (2003). However, my focus is
exclusively on parties’ position regarding the cultural axis of conflict.
Contrary to Kitschelt and McGann (1995), I argue that a specific position
regarding distributive issues is not one of the defining features of this party
family. On the contrary, right-wing populist parties’ positions regarding
distributive conflicts are likely to vary as a function of the social-structural
characteristics of these parties’ electorate.
Ignazi, on the other hand, uses a single left-right dimension, and therefore
cannot distinguish between positions on the economic and the cultural axes.
This is a problem because left-right positions are correlated with both, as van
Spanje and van der Brug (2005) have shown.
(2) Their populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a political line
of conflict between them and the established parties. This is the “political
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logic” of their mobilization, which these parties use to portray themselves as
anti-cartel-parties and defenders of real democracy, allowing them to bridge
internal divisions within their heterogeneous electorate.
(3) A hierarchical internal structure, which sets them apart from the pluralist
character of the established parties. This allows them to repeatedly revert their
policy-positions in response to sentiments in the populace, as the vast country-
specific literature on their programmatic stances indicates. For example, the
Austrian FPÖ changed its position regarding the European Union repeatedly
since the late 1980s.
Parties have to conform to all three criteria to be included in the group of extreme
right-wing populist parties. For example, Mudde (1996: 231ff, 2000) criticizes the
concept of populism, employed on its own, as primarily describing a political style
and not a specific ideology. While I agree on this point, I still consider a populist anti-
establishment discourse as a central element in distinguishing right-wing populist
from established right-wing parties that may hold similar policy positions. Since the
empirical analysis in the next section primarily focuses on parties’ positions in
political space, I will provide some support concerning the other two criteria in a brief
manner now.
Besides their anti-establishment discourse, right-wing populist parties are also set
apart from other parties by their hierarchical internal structure. As I have argued, this
results in a strategic flexibility that was already a key to their success in the 1980s,
when they propagated quite diverse issues, such as neo-liberal demands in the case of
the Front National and the FPÖ, for example (e.g. Ignazi 2003). Their strategic
flexibility was also their prime advantage in the 1990s, making it possible for them to
advocate policies that the established parties refrained from. This allows them to
rapidly take clear positions regarding previously unpoliticized issues such as
opposition against the EU, interpreting European integration in terms of the cultural
axis of conflict, as we shall see. While the established parties are divided regarding
European integration and therefore avoid taking clear positions (Kriesi et al.
Forthcoming, Bartolini 2004), the populist right can successfully combine advocating
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such issues with the political anti-establishment logic of their mobilization, portraying
the established parties as a closed cartel.12
Evidence to support the claim of the importance of parties’ internal organizational
structure is provided by the two cases where a pre-existing, established party
underwent a transformation to a populist party. The rise of the Austrian FPÖ or the
Swiss SVP – who are both candidates for the populist right party family – was
accompanied by an abandonment of their former pluralist party organizations in favor
of a hierarchical internal structure allowing a charismatic leader to dominate the party.
This is supported by Ignazi’s (2003: 111-116) analysis of the Austrian case as well as
by the Swiss experience, where Blocher curbed internal pluralism and managed to
dominate first the Zurich section of the SVP and then the national party structure
(Meienberg et al. 2004).
The remaining two likely candidates for inclusion in the extreme right-wing
populist group, namely, the Front National and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn, also
fulfill the second and third criterion. The Front National’s anti-establishment
discourse is well known, Jean-Marie Le Pen regularly referring to the established
parties as the “gang of four” and denounces the lies of the “candidates of the system”
(Le Monde, 25.4.1995, p. 5). At the same time, the party’s structure is extremely
centralized and hierarchical (Venner 2002). The Pim Fortuyn movement is also a clear
case, the LPF essentially having consisted of Fortuyn, the candidates for parliament
having been personally selected by him (Pennings, Keman 2003).
The following analysis will track the positions of the LPF, the Front National, the
FPÖ and the SVP in the political space constituted by the programmatic positions
advocated within their respective party systems. The structure of political space in
these countries can then be compared with the cases of Germany and Great Britain,
where no strong extreme right-wing populist parties are present at the national level.
 A last caveat is in order here, relating to the type of data used for the analysis: As
Mair and Mudde (1998: 224) have argued, a classification of party families along
ideological lines should be based on their “true” ideological position and not on their
                                                 
12 Of course, this is a feasible strategy only as long as they are not in government – once they are in
government, this turns out to be a problem, since they cannot adopt their propositions (see Heinisch
2003 on Austria). In Switzerland, this seems to be different, with Blocher adopting several
measures consistent with the parties’ line. At the same time, it remains an unsettled question to
which degree government participation poses a problem for right-wing populist parties’ anti-
establisment discourse. To a certain degree, the Swiss SVP and the Austrian FPÖ have managed to
hold on to double strategy of government participation and anti-establishment rhetoric.
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policy positions, which the authors judge too “soft” and circumstantial. I do not
consider this a problem for two reasons: First of all, the classification will rely on
parties’ positions in three elections, making extraordinary campaigns less of a
problem. Secondly, even if parties’ policy positions were too unstable to warrant a
clear classification, this problem can be solved by taking into account parties’
positions relative to the other parties within a party system. As opposed to an
approach based on absolute positions, this accounts for variation in the political
spectrum from country to country, focusing on the stability of a party’s relative
position within its party system, in line with the criterion of relative extremeness.
5. Right-wing populist parties and their competitors in the political
space of the 1990s and early 2000s
Research design
To be able to identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition in
elections, a media analysis of parties’ “political offer” in the two months preceding
the election for each country’s first parliamentary chamber was conducted. In each
country – Austria, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and Britain – all
articles and newspaper adverts related to the electoral contest or politics in general
during the last two months before Election day for three elections in the 1990s and
early 2000s and for one election in the 1970s were selected from a quality newspaper
and a tabloid.13 The articles and ads were then coded sentence by sentence using the
method developed by Kleinnijenhuis and his collaborators (see Kleinnijenhuis and De
Ridder 1998 and Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001). For the present purposes, only
relationships between political actors and political issues are taken into account. For
reasons of space, the results from the elections in the 1970s are not analyzed.
Political actors were coded according to their party membership. Small parties
were grouped; for example, in France, the UDF category comprises several small
                                                 
13 The newspapers were Die Presse and Kronenzeitung in Austria, Le Monde and le Parisien for
France, NRC Handelsblad and Algemeen Dagblad in the Netherlands, Neue Zürcher Zeitung and
Blick for Switzerland, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild in Germany, and The Times and The Sun in
Britain.
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center parties as well. To insure reliability, some of the smaller parties had to be
excluded from the analysis, when there was not enough information on their issue
positions. For the political issues, a detailed coding schema was used, distinguishing
between 200 or more categories. For the statistical analysis, they were regrouped into
12 broader categories. In the following, the content of these categories is specified.
All categories have a clear direction, and actor’s stance towards them can be either
positive or negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in the figures
later on:
- Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state
retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment programs,
health care programs. Valence issues such as statements “against unemployment”
or “against recession” were dropped if there was no specification of whether the
goal was to be achieved by state intervention or by deregulation.
- Budget: Budgetary rigor, reduction of the state deficit, cut on expenditures,
reduction of taxes that have no effects on redistribution.
- Economic liberalism (ecolib): Support for deregulation, for more competition, and
for privatisation. Opposition to market regulation, provided that the proposed
measures do not have an impact on state expenditure – this is the distinguishing
criterion from the Welfare-category. Opposition to economic protectionism in
agriculture and other sectors.
- Cultural liberalism (cultlib): Support for the goals of the new social movements:
Peace, solidarity with the third world, gender equality, human rights. Support for
cultural diversity, international cooperation (except for the European Union and
Nato), support for the United Nations. Opposition to racism, support for the right
to abortion and euthanasia and for a liberal drug policy. Cultural protectionism,
coded negative: Patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition and
national sovereignty, traditional moral values.
- Europe: Support for European integration – including enlargement – or for EU-
membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria.
- Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research.
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- Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the
restriction of the number of foreigners.
- Army: Support for the army (including Nato), for a strong national defence and for
nuclear weapons.
- Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality and political
corruption.
- Environment (eco): support for environmental protection, opposition to atomic
energy.
- Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the
extension of direct democratic rights, calls for the efficiency of the public
administration.
- Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure.
The data are now analysed using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), which results in a
representation of parties and issues in a low-dimensional space in every country. MDS
allows objects to be represented graphically according to measures of similarity or
dissimilarity between them (Coxon 1982, Rabinowitz 1975). In our case, for each of
the 12 categories, the mean distance between the individual parties and the issues
comprising the category has been calculated. To give the most salient relationships
between political actors and issues more weight than less salient ones in the analysis,
a Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling has been used.14 There are always
distortions between the “real” distances and their graphical representation in the low-
dimensional space resulting from the MDS, but the weighting procedure means that
the distances corresponding to salient relationships between parties and issues will be
more accurate than less salient ones.
In all six countries, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the
move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the
clearest reduction in the Raw Stress statistic,15 which is a measure for goodness-of-
                                                 
14 This can be carried out using the algorithm Proxscal, which is implemented in SPSS.
15 Holland is a partial exception, because a three-dimensional solution is also possible.
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fit.16 The results of the analysis are presented in Figures 1 to 6. It has to be
emphasized that the dimensions resulting from the MDS analysis are not substantially
meaningful. The only relevant information provided is the distance between the
parties and the issue categories. This means that the solution can be freely rotated.
However, to facilitate the interpretation, it is possible to lay axes into the distribution
that are theoretically meaningful. Another point that has to be kept in mind is that the
distances in the solutions are only meaningful in relation to each other, and not in
absolute terms. Thus, for example, right-wing populist parties may not be just next to
subject of immigration in absolute terms, because their proximity to other issues also
“pulls” them in another direction.
In the six figures, a first axis has been drawn between “welfare” and “economic
liberalism” as a representation of the distributional political conflict. All the
configurations have been rotated to make this axis lie horizontally in political space.
This line can be considered the traditional left-right divide, or, arguably, the political
content of the traditional state-market cleavage. The cultural axis has been drawn by
connecting “immigration” and “cultural liberalism”, the two issues that correspond to
the axis running from a libertarian-universalist to a traditionalist-communitarian
position.
The first thing we notice when looking at the general patterns is that the
configuration of political alternatives presented in the six party systems is strikingly
similar. Political competition everywhere is structured by an economic and by a
cultural axis of conflict, although to varying degrees. In France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland, there are signs of an integration of the two dimensions, cultural
liberalism being associated with a pro-welfare position and anti-immigration stances
lying closer to economic liberalism pole of the state-market axis. Britain is an
exception in that immigration played a minor role in the elections under investigation
here and thus does not appear in the figure. However, as in the other countries,
cultural liberalism, along with support for the EU is a polarizing issue in Britain.
                                                 
16 The values for the Stress I statistic, which is more appropriate for an estimation of goodness-of-fit
of the final configuration, is 0,32 for Austria, 0,29 for France, 0,28 for the Netherlands, 0,32 for
Switzerland, 0,34 for Germany and 0,25 for Britain.
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Figure 1: Austria
Legend: fpo: Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Austrian Freedom Party); ovp: Österreichische
Volkspartei (conservatives); lif: Liberales Forum; spo: Social Democrats; gr: Greens.
In the following, I first discuss the countries displaying a strong presence of parties
that are presumed to belong to the right-wing populist party group, testing the
hypothesis that they can be considered a common party family. I then analyze the
proposition that in Britain and Germany established right-wing parties exist that are
situated in a similar position in political space, thereby weakening the chances of an
electoral breakthrough of more extreme parties.
An extreme right-wing populist party family?
As I have briefly laid out, the French Front National, the Austrian FPÖ, the Dutch List
Pim Fortuyn and the Swiss SVP are all characterized by an anti-political-
29
establishment discourse and a hierarchical internal structure. To the degree that they
are situated in a distinctly extreme position on the universalistic-traditionalist axis,
then, they can be considered as belonging to a common party family. Figures 1 to 4
clearly show that these parties are situated at the extreme of the political spectrum in
their respective countries. All of them are furthest away from cultural liberalism,
which comprises universalistic positions and the free choice of lifestyles. In three of
the four countries, France, Austria and Switzerland, right-wing populist parties are
also the most fervent opponents of immigration. The figures thus clearly show these
parties are located at the one pole of the cultural axes of conflict. By contrast, the LPF
stands out for not being particularly opposed to immigration, raising doubts
concerning its inclusion in the category of right-wing populist parties.
Figure 2: France
Legend: front: Front National, Mouvement National Républicain (MNR); rpr: Rassemblement pour la
République; udf: Union pour la Démocratie Française, small center parties; mrg: Mouvement des
Radicaux de Gauche; psf: Parti Socialiste Français; pcf: Parti Communiste Français; ecolo: Verts,
ecological parties; rl: radical left.
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Concerning all of the issues on the cultural dimension, right-wing populist parties
are clearly at the opposite pole from the New Left, represented by the Social
Democrat and Green parties. As to the universalistic pole of the cultural divide, we
can see that in Switzerland and in the Netherlands, support for European integration is
even more polarizing than cultural liberalism, supporting the hypothesis that attitudes
towards the EU are becoming “embedded” in the cultural axis of conflict (Kriesi et al.
Forthcoming). Finally, right-wing populist parties are also near to law and order
policies (“security”) and institutional reforms, where calls for direct democracy are
included. However, this is not necessarily what distinguishes them from other parties.
Figure 3: Switzerland
Legend: svp: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party); rr: radical right, lib: Liberal
Democrats (FDP and other liberal parties), cvp: Christian Democrat group; sp: Social Democrats; gr:
Greens.
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After having presented the general picture, I will now discuss the differences in a
following brief interpretation focused on the individual countries, addressing, among
other points, right-wing populist parties’ varying positions regarding the economic
axis of conflict.
In Austria (Figure 1), the cultural axis cuts across the distributional axis very
clearly. The FPÖ is located on the cultural line of conflict and rather remote from the
distributional axis, near to anti-immigration and furthest away from cultural
liberalism. At the same time, the FPÖ has moved away from neo-liberalism, which
was an issue it propagated in the 1980s (e.g. Ignazi 2003), and is now located nearer
to “welfare” than to economic liberalism. This is less visible in the figure, where other
issues also condition its position, but the similarity measures show that between 1999
and 2002, the FPÖ has completely reversed its position and has switched to a pro-
welfare and anti-economic liberalism position.17 This move is in line with a strategy
aiming to mobilize the losers of economic modernization and globalization. Indeed,
the FPÖ represents something like the “master case” of a modernization loser party,
combining exclusionary community construction with leftist economic stances. This
is not equivalent to success, of course, since the party has faced the problem of
becoming a government party and of being struck by internal disputes. However, what
is also apparent is that established parties may seek to attract the same potential a
right-wing populist party has so far mobilized, even if this is more difficult for them
due to their pluralist internal structure, as I have argued. Thus, it is quite striking how
close the Conservatives (ÖVP) have moved to the FPÖ’s position, especially in the
1999 election campaign.
In France, we find a situation similar in some respects to Austria. The cultural
axis also clearly cuts across the distributional axis, and here too, cultural liberalism
and anti-immigration stances are located at the extreme points of this axis (Figure 2).
The empirical analysis of political space thus reveals a triangular distribution, with the
parties of the left situated on the upper left, the moderate right-wing parties to their
right and the Front National at the lower end of the cultural axis. This triangular
pattern conforms to analysis of the value preferences of French voters (Grunberg,
Schweisguth 2003). At the same time, the Front National’s position regarding
                                                 
17 The tables containing the issue positions of political parties and the salience of the issues for the
respective parties are available online from website of the project “National political change in a
globalizing world“: http://www.ipz.unizh.ch/npw/.
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distributional issues is not clear-cut. In 2002, it has moved nearer to economic
liberalism and away from the more pro-welfare stance it had taken in 1988 and 1995.
Figure 4: The Netherlands
Legend: lpf: List Pim Fortuyn, Leefbar Nederland; vvd: Conservatives; cd: Christian Democrat group;
d66: Democrats ’66; pvda: Worker’s Party; gl: Green Left (Groenlinks, PSP, PPR).
In Switzerland, the cultural axis appears highly polarizing, and the SVP is clearly
situated at the one pole of this opposition, advocating cultural protectionism as
opposed to cultural liberalism, and a strict immigration policy (Figure 3). The SVP’s
fervent opposition to joining the European Union is also evident in the location of this
issue, whose position is much less centred than in most of the other countries. At the
same time, we can see that the cultural axis of conflict does not cut across the
distributional one very clearly. In other words, we find signs of an integration of the
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two dimensions; anti-immigration being located much nearer to economic liberalism
than to welfare state support. Hence, the SVP’s positioning in the economic domain
diverges from a position suitable to mobilize the economic potential of modernization
losers deriving from the globalization process. However, as a non-member of the
European Union, the SVP’s refusal to join the EU can be considered an expression of
protectionism as well as part of a syndrome of opposition to the perceived danger for
the national community and its distinct traditions. And in Switzerland, the salience of
the cultural dimension of conflict is clearly higher than that of the redistributional
conflict. Indeed, an analysis of the voting determinants of the SVP shows that the
cultural-identitarian logic of mobilization clearly prevails, opposition to the EU being
the most important factor influencing voting choice for the SVP (Kriesi et al. 2005).
However, what is most striking about the SVP is the fact that it has moved from a
moderately rightist position in 1975 (data not shown here) into a political space
originally occupied by radical right-wing parties such as Freiheitspartei, Schweizer
Demokraten and Eidgenössisch-demokratische Union. As can be seen in Figure 3, the
SVP’s position is identical to the one of the radical right group, which comprises the
parties just mentioned. However, in the course of the SVP’s programmatic shift, the
radical right wing parties in Switzerland have almost vanished – due to the diminished
attention they have gained in the media, we can no longer estimate their position in
1999.
Finally, in the Netherlands, the axis connecting cultural liberalism and
immigration does cut across the distributional axis, but there are also signs of an
integration of the two dimensions (Figure 4).18 The LPF is manifestly located far away
from cultural liberalism. This reflects its opposition to the multicultural model of
social integration, demanding instead that foreigners adapt to the Dutch culture. At the
same time, the Pim Fortuyn movement is located rather near to an anti-immigration
stance but in fact, the conservative VVD advocates such a position even more clearly.
The LPF’s position reflects the fact that Pim Fortuyn very much advocated an
innovative ideological cluster of his own, which does not fully conform to the
libertarian-universalistic vs. communitarian-traditionalist dimension of conflict.
Hence, while he was opposed to multicultural society (that are part of the cultural
liberalism category), he held libertarian values concerning homosexuality and related
                                                 
18 Unfortunately, the “Centrumsdemokraten” and other radical right parties could not be included in
the analysis because there are too few observations regarding their positioning.
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societal values. He expresses neither tough stances against immigration, nor a strong
law and order position, as our data show. However, he did criticize the
individualization and fragmentation of society (Pennings, Keman 2003: 62), thus
aiming at the communitarian potential I have sketched out, yet in a different way than
the other right-wing populist parties do. Consequently, I believe it would be a mistake
to classify the LPF as an extreme right-wing populist party similar to the Front
National, the FPÖ or the SVP. Pennings and Keman (2003), in an analysis of party
manifesto data from the MRG-group come to a similar conclusion, noting that the
LPF bears more resemblance with moderate right-wing parties in other European
countries than with extreme right-wing parties. As far as the LPF’s programmatic
profile regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism is concerned, it is clearly
nearer to a liberalist than to a pro-state position.
What is also striking is how in the Netherlands, all the established parties have
moved away from cultural liberalism, though not necessarily towards anti-
immigration stances. The success of Pim Fortuyn’s programmatic stance thus has to
be seen in the light of (i) an established party already taking a clear position at the
traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural axis of conflict, namely, the liberal
VVD, and (ii) strong competition from other parties, imitating the ideological mix
developed by Pim Fortuyn, collectively challenging what had appeared a multicultural
consensus.
No space for the populist right in Britain and Germany?
Starting with Germany (Figure 5), we can see that the basic structure of political space
is quite similar to the one found in the four countries already discussed. The cultural
line of opposition runs from cultural liberalism to anti-immigration stances, cutting
across the economic axis very clearly. In 1994, both the Ecologists as well as the
Social Democrats are located at the left-libertarian/universalistic pole of the cultural
axis, as in the other countries examined, and according to general expectations. The
FDP in this election is very liberal both in economic, as well as in societal terms. The
Union, on the other hand, is located in a rather centrist position regarding both
dimensions. Thus, while the resulting configuration is triangular, as noted by Kriesi et
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al. (Forthcoming), the space at the traditionalist-communitarian axis is not yet
occupied.
Figure 5: Germany
Legend: ecolo: Greens, pds: Democratic Socialists, spd: Social Democrats, Union: Christian Democrats
(CDU, CSU), fdp: Liberals
Between 1994 and 2002, we witness a quite astonishing general move of all parties
towards the traditionalist-communitarian pole, with the (partial) exception of the
Ecologists. While the SPD in 1998 takes a centrist position on both dimensions –
similar to the Union’s location in the first election – the latter has moved further to the
anti-immigration pole of the axis. Thus, while the configuration remains triangular,
the two main parties have both moved away from a libertarian-universalistic position.
Without having seen the emergence of a strong challenging party of the populist right,
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German political space is thus characterized by a configuration resembling the one
found in the countries where this has been the case. The Union’s location is similar to
the one exhibited by the populist right in other countries, leaving little room for the
latter, except for small parties of the radical right that were not sufficiently present in
the media to enter into our analysis.
Figure 6: Britain
Legend: labour: Labour Party, cons: Conservative Party, libdem: Liberal Democrats.
Although political space is also clearly two-dimensional in Britain (Figure 6), the
situation there is somewhat different compared to the countries discussed so far.
While and a cultural dimension is visible in the positioning of the major parties, is
only structured by the libertarian-universalistic pole (marked black), lacking the
ideological counter-pole of an exclusionary community construction based on an
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opposition to immigration. Budgetary rigor is located at the opposite extreme in
political space. This is not entirely surprising because cutting back the state is
associated with a neo-conservative political position that is liberal in economic terms,
but traditionalist in cultural matters (Habermas 1985, Eatwell 1989). Right-wing
populist parties such as the Front National and the FPÖ have advocated similar
positions in the 1980s (Ignazi 2003). Even in the 1990s, budgetary rigor is associated
with a traditionalist-communitarian stance regarding the cultural dimension in
Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, although not in Germany (see
Figures 1-5).
However, support for or opposition against universalistic principles clearly play a
role in parties’ appeals. This dimension also includes stances towards the European
Union, similarly to Switzerland. While Labour and the Liberal Democrats switch their
positions regarding the cultural conflict between 1997 and 2001, the Conservatives
are furthest away from cultural liberalism and Europe. However, Labour in 1997 and
the Liberal Democrats in 2001 come rather near to their position, making it less
extreme in relative terms.
Still, the Conservatives’ have a clear neo-conservative profile, accepting societal or
economic modernity but rejecting cultural modernity (representing what Habermas
[1985] has identified as the core traits of neo-conservatism), which was combined
early on with a discourse in defence of national tradition under Margaret Thatcher
(Eatwell 2004: 64). However, a potential for communitarian-traditionalist positions
seems to exist all the same, given the success of the UK Independence Party in the last
European elections, for example. According to Eatwell’s (2004) thesis, the historical
weakness of the British extreme right is not due to structural factors, political culture
or even institutions, a frequently quoted explanation (e.g. Ignazi 2003), but to the
nature of the extremist parties themselves, internally divided and quite radical. In this
sense, the British Nationalist Party’s “modernization” strategy (see Eatwell 2004),
adopting a differentialist cultural discourse as opposed to overt racism, and targeting
disadvantaged social groups, may prove successful in the long run.
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5. Conclusion
The evidence from the analysis of political space shows that political conflicts in the
six countries examined are structured by an economic state-market and by a cultural
axis of conflict. Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, I have argued that the
issues associated with this axis – the libertarian goals brought up by the New Social
Movements of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the conservative counter-reaction
represented by movements of the right – can be interpreted in terms of an opposition
between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values or
conceptions of justice. The reactionary pole of this axis is characterized by an
opposition to the universalistic conceptions of the New Left – the latter including the
right to difference, societal permissiveness and support for supranational integration
in the European Union – as well as by an anti-immigration stance. I have further
argued that the latter represents an attempt at community construction based on the
exclusion of culturally different citizens. With the exception of Britain, where the
immigration issue is almost absent from the political debate, the cultural liberalism of
the New Left and the anti-immigration stances advocated by right-wing populist
parties lie at opposing poles of the cultural line of opposition.
The French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Swiss People’s
Party are clearly positioned at the traditionalist-communitarian pole of this opposition.
Together with the two other criteria proposed – a populist anti-establishment-
discourse and a hierarchical internal party organization, centred on a charismatic
leader – they can be considered members of the same ideological family of parties.
While the populist-organizational criteria also apply for the Dutch Pim Fortuyn
movement, its position on the cultural axis of conflict differs from that of the other
populist parties. Hence, while Pim Fortuyn opposed the multicultural model of society
associated with the libertarian left, he did not put forward any tough anti-immigration
stances. Consequently, he does not satisfy the criteria I have put forward to identify
members of the extreme right party family, namely, an extreme position on the
cultural axis of conflict.
By contrast, I have proposed the label those parties that satisfy the criteria of
extremeness on the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian axis
“extreme right-wing populist”. Like all labels used to define these parties, the term
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“right” is actually misleading in this context, because these parties do not represent an
extreme form of right-wing thinking, as Mudde (2000: 179) argues convincingly.
However, with the term “New Right” comprising too diverse strands (Eatwell 1989),
we are by convention stuck with terms identifying these parties as part of the “right”.
Indeed, extreme right-wing populist parties stand out for their extreme position on
the cultural axis of conflict and not for a specific stance regarding the state-market
conflict. Contrary to Kitschelt’s (1995) prediction, not all successful right-wing
populist parties are pro-market, as the Austrian case demonstrates most clearly. Other
parties, such as the French Front National, change their position regarding
distributional conflict frequently, most probably reflecting their inability to satisfy the
diverging economic preferences of their voters, as demonstrated by Perrineau (1997)
and Mayer (2002). Of the three parties included in the extreme populist right group,
only the Swiss SVP is consistently pro-market.
A final note regarding a proper definition of the extreme right-wing populist party
family is in order here. My criteria being primarily designed to draw a distinction
between this group and the pluralist parties of the established right, they do have the
drawback of being rather insensitive towards internal differentiations within the
extreme right. Indeed, concerning parties’ stances as they are put forward in election
campaigns, there is hardly a difference between the French Front National and the
Swiss SVP or the smaller parties of the radical right in Switzerland (Freiheitspartei,
Schweizer Demokraten and so forth). On the other hand, all these parties embody
what Mudde (2000: 178-182) has defined as the extreme right core: Nationalism,
welfare chauvinism, xenophobia and law and order. Thus, while a further
differentiation between the moderate and more extreme parties would have its merits,
it would have to rely on criteria that are difficult to validate. For instance, none of
these parties overtly challenges democracy. Drawing borders within the extreme right-
wing populist group therefore is no easy task (see also Mudde 2000).
More important in my view is a clear distinction between extreme right-wing
populist parties and parties of the established right. Although this may at first sight
seem too trivial a problem to merit much discussion, it is in fact essential, as this
analysis shows. For example, the Dutch VVD’s ideological position in political space
corresponds closely to the profile exhibited by the three members of the extreme
right-wing populist group. Given these similarities, a distinction based on origin,
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which would classify the Swiss SVP as an established conservative party and the
Austrian FPÖ as a liberal party, makes little sense. A major difference then lies in the
anti-political-establishment rhetoric and the hierarchical internal structure of right-
wing populist parties.
The rhetorical element corresponds to a type of mobilization specific to this party
group, linking popular discontent with the propagation of a political division between
them and the “cartel” represented by the political establishment. A hierarchical
internal structure, on the other hand, enables populist parties to quickly respond to
changing moods in the populace. This opportunism allows them to interpret new
issues in terms on the cultural axis of conflict they mobilize on. An example is the
FPÖ and its changing stances regarding the EU, evidenced in the media coverage of
their campaigns. This may well be the reason why the populist right is the group of
parties most opposed to the issue of European integration, since Kriesi et al.
(Forthcoming) have argued that the established parties do not take a clear stance
regarding this question due to their internal divisions. Such flexibility in strategic
positioning is quite difficult to achieve for parties with a pluralist internal structure,
despite the fact that these parties are becoming more centralized as well (Katz, Mair
1995, Blyth, Katz 2005).
Finally, the analysis has shown that the lack of success of right-wing populist
parties in Germany and Britain can at least partially be explained by the fact that
established parties in these countries exhibit a programmatic profile similar to the one
characteristic of the populist right. In Germany, the Union (CDU and CSU) covers the
political space in which right-wing populist parties foster in other countries. Political
conflicts in Germany in this and other respects closely resemble those found in the
other countries. Britain, by contrast, stands out for not having seen the immigration
issue ascend to the central role it played in the other countries. However, libertarian-
universalistic issues are highly polarizing there as well, indicating that the
universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian axis can play a role even in the absence
of the immigration-issue. The British Conservatives take a clear-cut position
regarding this conflict, combining it, as the Swiss SVP does, with an opposition to the
European Union. Thus, from this perspective the chances for new parties seem rather
limited in Britain. At the same time, the recent success of the UK Independence Party
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as well as the rising appeal of the British Nationalist Party (see Eatwell 2004) urge to
temper all too clear-cut predictions.
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